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Knowledge and Awareness 
Clayton Littlejohn 
 
[Forthcoming in Analysis as part of a symposium on Pritchard’s Epistemological 
Disjunctivism.] 
 
Introduction 
Pritchard defends an account of perceptual knowledge according to which this 
knowledge is knowledge you have in virtue of having factive and reflectively 
accessible rational support for your perceptual beliefs (2012: 13).  Pritchard’s proposal 
combines internalist and externalist elements and seeks to capture the insights of 
these rival approaches.  His view is internalist insofar as he thinks of the rational 
support our perceptual beliefs have as one that is reflectively accessible.  His view is 
externalist insofar as it characterizes the rational support you have when you know, 
say, that there’s an owl on the branch outside your window as factive. This rational 
support isn’t cobbled together out of conditions common to the case of perception 
and hallucination, so perceptual contact with things in your surroundings confers 
upon you a kind of epistemic benefit you cannot receive when it merely seems to 
you that you see an owl. Pritchard deftly fends off a variety of objections to his 
proposal. It’s clear that his view emerges as superior to most of its rivals.  In spite of 
the book’s many virtues, I think a serious difficulty arises for his view. I don’t think 
there’s any internalist insight here to capture. 
 There seem to be three main intuitions that tempt people to go internalist or 
incorporate internalist elements into their theories of knowledge: the notorious 
new evil genius intuition (i.e., the intuition that everything that matters to 
justification or rationality is common to the best cases and the cases of systematic 
deception), the ability intuition (i.e., the intuition that it matters whether the 
accuracy your beliefs is attributable to you or your cognitive abilities), and the 
responsibility intuition. 1   Pritchard’s motivation for introducing the internalist 
element into his proposal has nothing to do with the first two intuitions. It’s the 
third that does the work:  
… a fundamental difficulty for epistemic externalist 
positions … is that it is hard on this view to capture 
any adequate notion of epistemic responsibility. For if 
the facts in virtue of which one’s beliefs enjoy a good 
epistemic standing are not reflectively available to 
one, then in what sense is one even able to take 
epistemic responsibility for that epistemic standing 
(2012: 2)?    
To vindicate this intuition about responsibility, Pritchard proposes something 
along the lines of this thesis:  
Reflective Access: In knowing that p, your belief 
about p is supported by reflectively accessible reasons. 
On a natural reading of Reflective Access, a necessary precondition on coming to 
know p is the possession of accessible reasons.  Notice that these reasons aren't 
(just) reasons why you believe p; rather, they are your reasons for believing p and 
they are good reasons for believing p.  It might seem quite natural to think that a 
subject's reasons have to satisfy an access constraint since a subject's reasons for φ-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pritchard rejects the first (2012: 38) and doesn’t rely on the second, although he 
accepts it (2009). 
ing have to capture the light in which the subject φ'd.  And it might seem quite 
natural to think that beliefs constitute knowledge, in part, by being based on good 
reasons.  In spite of whatever initial plausibility Reflective Access has, I think that 
it's deeply problematic. 
 
Access and Awareness 
Some writers treat access as if it's a kind of awareness.2 I'll follow suit.  Access is a 
technical notion, but awareness seems like the kind of non-technical notion that we 
might invoke without having to first provide clear guidance about what it amounts 
to.  If we treat access as a kind of awareness, we could say that knowledge requires a 
kind of awareness of that which constitutes the rational basis for the relevant pieces 
of knowledge.  If the rational basis of our beliefs is constituted by facts or true 
propositions, the relevant kind of awareness-0f would just be awareness-that. If, 
however, the rational basis of our beliefs is constituted by something else (e.g., 
states of mind, states of affairs, events, substances, tropes), it might be that the 
relevant kind of awareness is awareness-of that is not awareness-that.3 
 Let's start with awareness-of.  Someone can be aware of things of all sorts, 
but I think it's helpful to distinguish between awareness of something that 
instances generalities and awareness of something that involves generality. If 
you're aware of the ticking of the clock, the cat in the corner, or the throbbing pain 
in your foot, everything you're aware of is particular.  Being aware of such things 
doesn't involve bringing them under any sort of generality and representing them 
as being instances of things that could have been instanced on other occasions or in 
other ways.  Because of this, it's difficult to see how this sort of awareness could 
play the kind of epistemic role required by Reflective Access.  You could be aware 
of the cat in the corner even if it was disguised to look like a dog. You could be 
aware of a tapping at the window that you thought wasn't coming from the window 
but was part of the movie you were watching.  In being aware of coarse-grained 
particulars (e.g., substances or events), this relation of awareness doesn't play any 
role in determining how confident you could reasonably be in believing something 
to be true.4  As a general constraint on the things that play the rational support role 
in the way reasons are alleged to, it better be that there cannot be significant 
differences in what it's rational to believe or be confident of between pairs of cases 
in which your reasons are identical.  Since there can be radical differences in what's 
rational to believe where you're aware of the very same coarse-grained particulars, 
awareness of such particulars cannot be what the possession of reasons consists in. 
 This rules out a certain reading of Pritchard's proposal.  We shouldn't think 
of perceptual knowledge as a matter of being aware of a certain kind of mental 
event, one that can be correctly described as an experience as of an owl or correctly 
described as seeing an owl.5  If we have one event that can be brought under 
multiple descriptions (i.e., an event in which one sees something or seems to see 
something), we'd need to know what description the subject brought the event 
under to determine whether her further beliefs would be rational or justified.  If 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Bergmann (2006) and Madison (2014), for example. 
3 For arguments that the rational basis consists of facts or true propositions, see 
Hyman (1999) and Williamson (2000). For arguments that it consists of something 
like attitudes, mental events, or states of mind, see Conee and Feldman (2008, 2011), 
Mitova (forthcoming), and Turri (2009). 
4 See Neta (2008). 
5 Mind you, Pritchard doesn’t intend his proposal to be read this way. 
conceived of merely as an experience of a certain kind, it seems that it's rational 
force would be quite different to the experience that's conceived of as one in which 
a subject sees something.  Thus, the story that Pritchard tells has to involve more 
than simply awareness of an experience that's an experience in which a subject sees 
something; rather, the subject has to take this experience to be one in which she 
sees something. 
 Some awareness-of is just awareness-that. The obvious case is that of being 
aware of a fact.  There is no difference between being aware of the fact that oil 
prices are slumping and being aware that oil prices are slumping.  This case differs 
from the previous cases of awareness-of in that it involves awareness of something 
general (i.e., something that is an instance of slumping).  My hunch is that any 
awareness-of that involves awareness of something general will involve the 
exercise of conceptual capacities.  (This would account for the fact that we’re not 
dealing with extensional contexts.) Because of the exercise of such capacities, such 
awareness will have a more obvious epistemic impact as the exercise of such 
capacities will involve representing something as falling under a generality (or 
failing to fall under one). Such representations will have a direct bearing on how 
rational it would be to be confident that something is so. If, say, you and your friend 
were both aware that it was an owl on the branch or aware of the fact that it is an 
owl on the branch (and not merely aware of an owl), it couldn't be rational for you 
to be agnostic about whether there were owls in the area.     
 What should we say about awareness of things like the arrangement of 
furniture in a room, the position of your limbs, or a thing's shape, color, or texture?  
It's not hard to imagine how someone might be aware of the chair, say, without 
being aware that it is a chair. (Think about stumbling around in the dark when you 
feel the thing but don't yet know what it is.)  It's harder to imagine how someone 
could be aware of the arrangement of furniture in a room without being aware that 
the chair is here and the table is over there. It's hard to see how someone could be 
aware of the table's shape without being aware that it is rectangular.  If these are, as 
I strongly suspect, instances of awareness-that, then it seems that this is another 
kind of awareness-of that will involve the exercise of conceptual capacities and will 
have a kind of direct significance when it comes to what's rational or reasonable for 
the subject to believe. If you're aware of the table's shape and the table is 
rectangular, you cannot be agnostic about whether it's circular.  If, however, you're 
aware of the table but not aware of it's shape, such agnosticism might well be 
understandable. 
 If we put these points together, the kind of awareness that we'd have to have 
to something for it to rationally constrain our beliefs is awareness-that, not 
awareness-of that is not, inter alia, awareness-that.  And this gives rise to a worry 
when we think about the way that Reflective Access connects knowledge and 
awareness.  When I asked initially about the relationship between knowledge and 
awareness, the question was about whether awareness of reasons might be a 
precondition on coming to know.  I now want to ask a different question: might the 
awareness that figures in Reflective Access just be knowledge?  It seems pretty clear 
that some awareness-of is not. It's hard to see any interesting connection between 
being aware of a tapping sound or a chair and knowledge that something is the 
case. What about knowledge and awareness-that?  Both are factive. Both involve 
the exercise of conceptual capacities. Both involve registering that things are a 
certain way in a way that goes beyond mere perception (i.e., you cannot both be 
aware that housing prices are continuing to rise and not be right about what's 
happening with housing prices).   
Consider, then, the following hypothesis:  
Identity:  You are aware that p iff you know that p. 
If Identity is correct, Reflective Access generates a vicious regress. According to 
Reflective Access, if you know p, your belief about p is supported by reflectively 
accessible reasons where these reasons consist of facts that you're aware of. Your 
reason for believing p cannot be p itself, so there must be some further fact that 
you're aware of, p', that provides rational support for believing p.  But, according to 
Identity, to be aware of p' is just to know p'. To know p', Reflective Access requires 
more rational support, support that consists of awareness of some yet further fact, 
p''. Identity tells us that this awareness is yet more knowledge. This carries on ad 
infinitum.6   
 One might respond by distinguishing access from awareness, but one 
cannot simply claim that they're distinct without offering some suggestion as to 
what access to a fact might be if it didn't involve awareness of it.  Since the regress 
gets started so long as being aware of the fact that p is required for having access to 
the fact that p, this isn’t a helpful line of response. 
 One might respond instead by challenging the idea that the relevant kind of 
awareness is awareness of facts, but I've explained above why awareness-of that 
doesn't involve awareness-that cannot be understood as awareness of something 
that provides rational support for a belief.  Perhaps it's true that many internalists 
would try to avoid the regress in this way, but perhaps it's also true that these 
internalists are confused.   
 To block the regress, one could argue that the awareness needn't be of a 
further fact.  At some point, the suggestion might be, you know p without being 
aware of some further fact.  This is a very good suggestion, but I don't see how we 
could square this with Reflective Access. The idea behind Reflective Access is that 
the awareness relates you to something that provides rational support for believing 
p by being eligible for being your reason for believing p. What plays this role, 
presumably, would be something that could convince you that p. The fact that it's 
raining doesn't seem to be the kind of thing that could convince you that it's 
raining, so it's hard to see how it could play the role required by Reflective Access. 
 Pritchard doesn't propose that your reason for believing p could be p itself.  
He thinks that in the perceptual case, your belief that, say, there's an owl on the 
branch is supported by some further fact: the fact that you see that it's an owl.  To 
combat the regress worry, he might pursue one of two responses. He might reject 
Identity or he might reject Reflective Access. Let's consider these responses in turn. 
 Some authors have attacked Identity on the grounds that a perceptual belief 
that fails to constitute knowledge because of environmental luck might 
nevertheless constitute awareness-that because of the perceptual link between the 
subject and things in her surroundings (McGlynn 2014).7  This sort of attack on 
Identity wouldn't suit Pritchard's purposes, however. Awareness-that is supposed to 
ensure that the subject is in a position to know.  Pritchard might suggest that 
awareness-that differs from knowledge insofar as only knowledge requires belief. 
This would solve the regress problem, but I don't think it's very plausible.  To be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This regress worry doesn’t just arise for proponents of Reflective Access, but also 
for those who, like Fumerton (1995), see a kind of access (acquaintance, in 
Fumerton’s case) to something that involves generality as a necessary precondition 
for possessing knowledge.   
7 For an argument that environmental luck cases don’t involve awareness of the 
relevant facts, see Littlejohn (2014). 
aware that, say, this cheese is a washed-rind cheese, you'd have to exercise 
conceptual capacities that aren't exercised in anything like perceptual experience. 
The exercise of these capacities is distinctive of belief, so belief has to be part of 
awareness-that. 
 If Identity isn't the weak link in the regress argument, we might take another 
look at Reflective Access.  We can block the regress by restricting Reflective Access 
so that reflectively accessible reasons are required only for certain kinds of 
knowledge.  So long as the knowledge that you see that p isn't itself knowledge that 
requires the support from some further reflectively accessible reason, this would 
stop the regress.  This move doesn't come without costs, however.   
 First, recall the motivation for Reflective Access was the desire to capture an 
internalist insight. If Reflective Access were restricted so that it applies only to 
certain kinds of knowledge, the resultant account would face just the sort of 
problem that Pritchard thinks arises for externalism. If Reflective Access is rejected 
for self-knowledge or perceptual knowledge, say, it might seem then that the 
subject couldn't take epistemic responsibility for having those beliefs that attain the 
good epistemic standing.  
 Second, if Reflective Access is restricted to stop the regress, it has to be 
restricted for the right reason.  Suppose that we agree that Reflective Access 
captures an important insight into inferential knowledge but leads to a distorted 
picture of self-knowledge.  How should we decide whether perceptual knowledge is 
the kind of knowledge that requires support from accessible reasons?  If it doesn't, 
Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivism would give us a distorted picture of 
perceptual knowledge for it would suggest, mistakenly, that such knowledge gets to 
be knowledge because of the rational support of reasons.8   
 The easiest way out of the difficulty is simply to reject Reflective Access.  
There is presently a debate about the ontology of reasons between parties who 
(mistakenly) think of reasons as states of mind or mental events and parties who 
(correctly) think of reasons as facts where both sides mistakenly think that the key 
to understanding how beliefs attain positive epistemic standing is by being 
supported by reasons.  Whatever else reasons are supposed to be, they're thought 
of as something like a sign, indicator, or clue which is available to the subject and 
that could lead rationally to the formation of a belief.  If we choose our examples 
correctly, we'll quickly see that the possibility of knowledge doesn't turn on 
whether there are available supporting reasons because we'll see that there are 
perfectly good cases of knowledge without clues.  Anscombe (1962) told us where to 
look for such cases. The knowledge that you have of the position of your own limbs 
is knowledge, but the beliefs that constitute knowledge don't count as rationally 
held because we can work out where our limbs are by relying on some clues.  If 
your legs are crossed and you know it, you don't work out which leg is on top of the 
other by consulting a feeling, a tickle, or a sensation that's a clue to how your legs 
are positioned.  There's a story to tell about how this knowledge is possible, but 
when we say, 'You know this because...' we don't fill in the dots by identifying the 
clues you relied on or the reasons that persuaded you. 
 It's clear that there are differences between observational knowledge and 
the knowledge that you have of the position of your own limbs. If Anscombe is 
right, the latter is not observational.  Still, the example is instructive.  If there are 
examples of knowledge without clues there must be a mistake in the argument for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For arguments that perceptual belief isn't based on reasons, see Littlejohn 
(forthcoming) and McGinn (2012). 
Reflective Access.  The mistake is to think that the key to understanding how 
beliefs can be responsibly held or be things we're held responsible for holding is to 
think of all beliefs that constitute knowledge as being held for reasons.  There are 
intentional actions we can rightly be held responsible for that aren't things that 
were done for reasons (e.g., things like idly doodling, emotional action, or action 
done on false beliefs), so I don't think that being motivated by reasons can be the 
key to understanding responsibility.  Actions and attitudes can, for example, be 
responsive to reasons even when there's nothing that was the agent's reason for 
forming those attitudes or performing those actions, so the key to understanding 
the responsibility we bear for our actions and attitudes must be understood in 
other terms.9 Once we see that, we can see that the internalist idea that motivates 
Reflective Access isn’t an internalist insight. And once we can see that, we can free 
ourselves from the assumptions that give rise to the regress problem that causes so 
much trouble for Reflective Access.  
 
Conclusion 
My main complaint about Pritchard's proposal is that it makes the mistake of trying 
to incorporate the internalist idea that knowledge comes from a kind of awareness 
of things that provide rational support for our beliefs.  Knowledge doesn’t get to be 
that way by being a belief supported by something further that you’re aware of. Not 
in every case, at any rate. Knowledge is awareness. It’s the fundamental kind of 
awareness of things like facts that involve generality.  Since the only awareness that 
relates us to reasons is knowledge, the internalist cannot help us understand where 
knowledge comes from.10 
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